Berlin, Feb 18 (.) German Chancellor Friedrich Merz has said that while Berlin is open to discussions about strengthening Europe’s nuclear deterrence, it has no intention of seeking its own atomic arsenal, distancing Germany from any move toward independent nuclear armament.
“I don’t want Germany to consider developing its own nuclear weapons,” Merz told political podcast “Machtwechsel,” commenting on the French proposal for creating a European nuclear deterrent.
Amid US’ increasingly unreliable guarantees as a security provider, and fears of a potential Russian attack on Europe, European nations – both EU and non-member states – have amped up their militarisation drive, with Germany leading the race, directing a significant portion of its budget into expanding the Bundeswehr, creation of additional military infrastructure, and research.
However, Russia for its part has mocked Berlin, as well as other European nations’ increasing bid to militarise, repeatedly denying of harbouring any intentions to attack Europe, and calling the militarisation drive among all nations as deliberate fearmongering to distract their own domestic public from each country’s administrative failures.

Pointing to Germany’s legal obligations under existing treaties, the Two Plus Four Treaty of 1990 for German reunification, and the Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1970, both of which bind Germany to refrain from acquiring nuclear weapons, Merz noted that Berlin remains uncertain whether Germany could legally withdraw from such frameworks, and as such continues to honour them.
Within NATO, Germany is a big participant in the transatlantic alliance’s nuclear burden-sharing arrangement.
Under the existing framework, Berlin has stationed aircraft at the Büchel Air Base are certified to deliver US nuclear weapons in the event of a conflict.
Merz said that, in theory, such arrangements could potentially be extended to include British or French nuclear weapons as part of a broader European pillar within NATO.
“In theory, it would be possible to apply this to British and French nuclear weapons as well,” he said. However, he cautioned that France’s nuclear deterrent is currently largely sea-based, raising technical and operational questions about how such cooperation could function in practice.
Merz confirmed he has discussed ways with French, and possibly British leaders, to strengthen Europe’s role within NATO’s overall deterrence structure, while continuing to keep the US’ nuclear umbrella as the alliance’s core component.
“We have nuclear-capable aircraft in the Bundeswehr… We are able to carry American nuclear weapons,” he said, adding that extending such capabilities to British or French systems would require resolving complex technical, legal and political issues.
He stressed that examining France’s proposal does not equate to endorsing nuclear proliferation. “In these times, one cannot leave such an offer from the French government unexamined,” Merz said, suggesting that strategic realities require open discussion even if Germany ultimately remains bound by its non-nuclear commitments.
Merz also addressed tensions surrounding the joint Franco-German-Spanish Future Combat Air System (FCAS), a next-generation fighter jet program designed to replace current fleets in the coming decades, stating that delays in the project stem in part from differing operational requirements among the partner countries.
According to Merz, France requires an aircraft capable of carrying nuclear weapons and operating from aircraft carriers – capabilities not currently needed by the German armed forces.
As a result, discussions are ongoing about whether two different variants of the fighter jet may need to be developed under the FCAS umbrella. He characterised the debate as technical rather than political, rooted in divergent military needs rather than diplomatic friction. . . KK