Dhaka, Feb 16 (.) After months of negotiations between Bangladesh’s National Consensus Commission and political parties, an agreement was reached on 84 reform proposals spanning multiple sectors.
From those understanding, the July Charter – a political blueprint intended for the rehaul, reshaping, and restructuring of governance and rebalancing all state institutions – was drafted.
Of the 84 proposals, 48 directly concern the constitution. Their implementation was placed before voters in a national referendum, where the “Yes” vote prevailed.
As per the agreement reached between parties, the constitutional reform process was designed as a part of a three-stage implementation programme.
With its first two phases; issuing the order, and referendum now complete, the process has entered its most crucial stage; translating the July Charter’s constitutional provisions into binding law.
The July Charter proposes far-reaching structural changes. Among them are a partial reduction of the Prime Minister’s exclusive executive authority, an expansion of the President’s role in certain key appointments, the introduction of a bicameral legislature, and the direct constitutional embedding of appointment procedures for major constitutional institutions.
Supporters describe the package as a recalibration of power designed to prevent concentration of authority and to strengthen institutional checks and balances.
Yet consensus has not been absolute. The BNP, while participating in the broader reform dialogue, submitted notes of dissent on several major provisions, particularly the structure and authority of the proposed upper house.
The party also incorporated its own constitutional reform framework into its election manifesto, signalling that its vision diverges on critical institutional questions.
Under the existing constitution, amendments require the support of two-thirds of the members of parliament.
However, the July Charter Implementation Order establishes a different route, proposing constitutional amendments to be undertaken by the Constitution Reform Council rather than by the regular parliament acting in its ordinary legislative capacity, making the procedural shift central to the debate surrounding the charter and its implementation.
During earlier discussions at the National Consensus Commission, parties such as the Jamaat-e-Islami and the National Citizens Party (NCP) argued that the July Charter reforms would amount to changes in the “basic structure” of the constitution.
If a regular parliament were to enact such changes, they warned, the amendments might later face judicial challenge. Granting a specially mandated reform body explicit authority to amend the constitution, they contended, would reduce the risk of future litigation and constitutional uncertainty.
The BNP has disagreed with the reasoning, with its representatives arguing that there was no need to establish a separate council and have questioned whether the President possessed constitutional authority to issue an “order” of this kind.
BNP standing committee member Salahuddin Ahmed stated immediately after the November 13 issuance that while the President may promulgate ordinances under the constitution, the issuance of a reform “order” raised legal concerns.
Despite those objections, the President proceeded with the July Charter (Constitutional Reform) Order, formally embedding the creation of the Constitution Reform Council within its framework.
According to the order, the Council must complete constitutional reforms within 180 working days from the commencement of its first session. Once that mandate is fulfilled, the Council will automatically dissolve. However, the order is silent on what would occur if reforms are not completed within that timeframe – a gap that has prompted questions among constitutional observers.
One of the most consequential reforms mandates the creation of an upper house within 30 working days of completing constitutional amendments, further calling the formation of an upper chamber of parliament based on a proportional representation (PR) system, in turn based on the vote shares obtained in elections to the lower house. The house’ term will run concurrently with that of the lower house, ending on the final day of the latter’s tenure.
While the BNP supports the principle of bicameralism, it differs over composition and powers. The party advocates distributing upper house seats strictly in proportion to the seats won in the lower house, and it opposes granting the upper house veto authority over constitutional amendments.
In contrast, other parties, including Jamaat-e-Islami and the NCP, have pressed for full implementation of the July Charter’s design, arguing that a robust upper chamber is essential for institutional balance.
The order authorises the Council to frame necessary provisions to facilitate the formation of the upper house and permits the government to issue instructions to remove obstacles in its establishment.
Whether these provisions withstand political and potential legal scrutiny may shape the next chapter of Bangladesh’s constitutional evolution.
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